Between October 28, 2008 and June 30, 2009 over 600 banks and bank holding companies accepted money from the United States government in exchange for preferred shares and warrants. Based on a matched sample of banks participating and not participating in this Capital Purchase Program (CPP), of each dollar of new government equity, on average participants levered roughly 13 cents to support increased lending while they used roughly 60 cents to increase their regulatory capital ratios. Over the previous business cycle, 2000–2008, allocation of new capital to support lending was higher than in 2008–2009 by nearly 30 cents per dollar of new capital. Moreover, in the previous downturn, 2000–2001, allocation to new lending was higher by an even greater amount. Banks’ exposure to past-due loans, which was higher in 2008 than in 2000 or in any other sample year, negatively predicts allocation of new capital to new lending. Characteristics of CPP participants suggest they were of two types: those with high commitments and opportunities for new lending, and those with exposures to certain troubled loan classes. Banks with high leverage and high expected costs of regulatory downgrades also were more likely participants. All of these results are consistent with banks having an optimal, target capital structure based on some form of tradeoff theory.

中文翻译：

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银行如何使用救助资金？最优资本结构、新股本和 TARP

2008 年 10 月 28 日至 2009 年 6 月 30 日期间，超过 600 家银行和银行控股公司接受了美国政府的资金以换取优先股和认股权证。根据参与和未参与此资本购买计划 (CPP) 的银行的匹配样本，每 1 美元的新政府股权，参与者平均使用大约 13 美分来支持增加贷款，而他们使用大约 60 美分来增加监管资本比率。在上一个商业周期（2000-2008 年）中，用于支持贷款的新资本配置比 2008-2009 年高出每 1 美元新资本近 30 美分。此外，在 2000 年至 2001 年的前一次经济衰退中，分配给新贷款的金额甚至更高。银行对逾期贷款的敞口，2008 年高于 2000 年或任何其他样本年，负面预测新资本分配给新贷款。CPP 参与者的特征表明他们有两种类型：一种是对新贷款有高承诺和机会的人，另一种是对某些问题贷款类别有风险敞口的人。杠杆率高且监管下调预期成本高的银行也更有可能成为参与者。所有这些结果都与基于某种形式的权衡理论具有最优目标资本结构的银行一致。杠杆率高且监管下调预期成本高的银行也更有可能成为参与者。所有这些结果都与基于某种形式的权衡理论具有最优目标资本结构的银行一致。杠杆率高且监管下调预期成本高的银行也更有可能成为参与者。所有这些结果都与基于某种形式的权衡理论具有最优目标资本结构的银行一致。