In this paper, I present the problem of scientific change as an explanatory problem, that is, as a philosophical problem concerning what logical forms of explanation we should employ in order to understand the major conceptual ruptures throughout the history of science. I distinguish between two logical forms of explanation: (a) empirical-scientific and (b) normative explanations. Based on this distinction, I distinguish between the scientific and the liberal versions of naturalism concerning the issue of scientific change. I argue in favor of the latter by showing that normative explanations are indispensable in order to fully understand scientific change. I also argue that we can defend scientific rationality without violating the naturalistic framework which is dominant in contemporary analytic philosophy. I conclude that endorsing scientific realism within a naturalistic framework is the only option for preserving scientific rationality.

在本文中，我将科学变革的问题作为一个解释性问题提出，即作为一个哲学问题，涉及为了理解整个科学历史中的主要概念性破裂而应采用何种逻辑形式的解释。我区分了两种逻辑解释形式：（a）经验科学解释和（b）规范解释。基于这种区别，我区分了关于科学变革问题的自然主义的科学版本和自由版本。我通过显示规范性解释对于充分理解科学变革是必不可少的，从而支持后者。我也认为，我们可以捍卫科学合理性，而不会违反在当代分析哲学中占主导地位的自然主义框架。