A state’s decision to engage in cyber operations has important implications for its trade. Successful cyber espionage could yield valuable trade secrets that could boost domestic production and spur economic growth. On the other hand, uncovered cyber operations could invite devastating sanctions that retard economic development. In spite of this, the nexus between trade and cyber attacks has received little attention in the literature. In this article, I explore how a state’s trade relations affect its propensity to engage in cyber attacks. I develop a theoretical framework that links the composition of a state’s trade to its deficit in proprietary information relative to other states. I decompose trade into its inter- and intra-industry components and show that while inter-industry trade is associated with higher incidence of state-sponsored cyber attacks, intra-industry trade has the opposite effect. I also show that these effects are non-monotonic, varying by the share of inter- or intra-industry trade in total trade. The results also show that states that have a heavy concentration of high-tech industries such as aerospace, computers, and pharmaceuticals have a higher propensity to engage in cyber espionage operations. These results are robust to a variety of controls and specifications.

一个国家从事网络运营的决定对其贸易具有重要影响。成功的网络间谍活动可能会产生有价值的商业机密，从而可以促进国内生产并刺激经济增长。另一方面，未被发现的网络运营可能会招致破坏性制裁，阻碍经济发展。尽管如此，贸易与网络攻击之间的联系在文献中很少受到关注。在本文中，我探讨了一个州的贸易关系如何影响其进行网络攻击的倾向。我建立了一个理论框架，将一个国家的贸易构成与其相对于其他国家的专有信息短缺联系起来。我将贸易分解为其产业间和产业内组成部分，并表明，尽管产业间贸易与国家发起的网络攻击的发生率较高相关，但产业内贸易却具有相反的作用。我还表明，这些影响不是单调的，随行业间或行业内贸易在总贸易中所占的份额而变化。结果还表明，航空航天，计算机和制药等高科技产业高度集中的州从事网络间谍活动的倾向更高。这些结果对于各种控制和规范都非常可靠。结果还表明，航空航天，计算机和制药等高科技产业高度集中的州从事网络间谍活动的倾向更高。这些结果对于各种控制和规范都非常可靠。结果还表明，航空航天，计算机和制药等高科技产业高度集中的州从事网络间谍活动的倾向更高。这些结果对于各种控制和规范都非常可靠。