Research on rebel behavior during conflicts has traditionally focused on the use of violent tactics. However, evidence from several intrastate wars suggests that armed groups also occasionally employ general strikes—a method of civil resistance that has typically been associated with nonviolent groups. But when do rebels resort to general strikes? I argue that these tactics have a particular function which can offset potential risks for rebels after they have suffered losses in previous battles: Through general strikes, rebels signal sustained authority to the local population. The argument is tested for districts in Eastern India using newly compiled, disaggregated data on contentious action during the Maoist conflict. The paper contributes to a burgeoning literature on wartime civilian activism in two ways: First, it shows that armed groups themselves rely situationally on civilian mobilization. Second, it investigates the effect of conditions endogenous to the conflict on these tactical choices.

传统上，对冲突期间叛军行为的研究主要集中在暴力战术的运用上。但是，来自几次州内战争的证据表明，武装团体偶尔也会进行大罢工，这是一种通常与非暴力团体有关的民事抵抗方法。但是叛军什么时候诉诸大罢工呢？我认为这些策略具有特殊的功能，可以抵消叛军在先前战斗中遭受损失后的潜在风险：通过大罢工，叛军向当地人民发出持续的权威。使用新汇编的，关于毛主义冲突期间的有争议行动的分类数据，对印度东部地区的论点进行了检验。本文通过两种方式为关于战时平民激进主义的新兴文学做出了贡献：第一，它表明武装团体本身在情势上依靠平民动员。其次，它研究了冲突的内在条件对这些战术选择的影响。