Under what conditions can dictatorships manage peaceful leadership transitions? This article argues that constitutional succession rules are critical for modern dictatorships, contrary to the predominant scholarly focus on hereditary succession or parties. An effective succession rule needs to solve dual problems of peaceful exit and peaceful entry. First, the rule must enable incumbents to exit power peacefully by reducing coup threats. Second, the rule must empower the designated successor to ensure that they can enter power peacefully. Constitutional rules help solve both problems, and are particularly effective when they appoint the vice president as the designated successor. The vice president’s access to material resources deters other factions from challenging the succession procedure, whereas designating successors without a power base is ineffective. Using original data on constitutional rules in African autocracies, I show that regimes that formally designate the vice president as the successor are more likely to undergo peaceful transitions.

独裁政权可以在什么条件下实现和平的领导权过渡？本文认为，宪法继承规则对于现代独裁政权至关重要，这与学术界对世袭继承或政党的主要关注相反。一个有效的继承规则需要解决和平退出和和平进入的双重问题。首先，该规则必须通过减少政变威胁使在位者和平退出权力。第二，该规则必须赋予指定的继任者权力，以确保他们可以和平地掌权。宪法规则有助于解决这两个问题，并且在任命副总统为指定继任者时特别有效。副总统获得物质资源的渠道阻止了其他派别挑战继任程序，而指定没有权力基础的继任者是无效的。我使用有关非洲专制国家宪法规则的原始数据，表明正式任命副总统为继任者的政权更有可能经历和平过渡。