This article discusses political state capture in the context of party patronage. Evidence of this is delivered from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the rotations of members of their management and supervisory boards. In this case, it is deemed that an interest group, which consists of politicians and representatives in the government administration, decides about the appointment and dismissal of board members through the corporate governance of SOEs and ownership policy of the state. We analyzed the scale and intensity of rotations in Poland of about twelve thousand joint-stock companies in the years 2001–2017 according to their ownership structure. We show that changes of managers and supervisory board members in state-owned enterprises are higher than in private companies and are related to political elections. We estimated that on average three months after a new government is formed, a peak of changes in the composition of boards is observed, though they are earlier in the case of a supervisory board. We conclude that this can be regarded as an example of state capture by politicians.

本文讨论了在政党赞助的背景下的政治状态俘获。证据来自国有企业（SOE）以及其管理和监事会成员的轮换。在这种情况下，可以认为由政府官员中的政客和代表组成的利益集团通过国有企业的公司治理和国家所有权政策来决定董事会成员的任命和罢免。我们根据其所有权结构分析了2001年至2017年间波兰约1.2万家股份制公司的轮换规模和强度。我们发现，国有企业中经理和监事会成员的变动高于私人公司，并且与政治选举有关。我们估计，在新政府组建后的三个月内，尽管在监事会中更早，但在董事会组成方面的变化却达到了顶峰。我们得出的结论是，这可以看作是政客占领国家的一个例子。