Abstract

This article studies the introduction of an EU-wide emission standard on the automobile market. Using panel data from 1998 to 2011, I find that firms decreased emission ratings by 14%. Firms use technology adoption and gaming of emission tests to decrease emissions, rather than shifting the sales mix or downsizing. I find that the standard missed its emission target, and from estimating a structural model, I find that the standard was not welfare improving. The political environment in the EU shaped the design and weak enforcement and resulted in firms’ choices for abatement by technology adoption and gaming.

中文翻译：

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减排策略和环境法规成本：欧洲汽车市场的排放标准

摘要

本文研究了汽车市场上欧盟范围排放标准的引入。使用1998年至2011年的面板数据，我发现企业的排放评级降低了14％。企业使用技术采用和排放测试的博弈来减少排放，而不是改变销售组合或缩小规模。我发现该标准未达到其排放目标，并且通过估算结构模型，我发现该标准并未改善福利。欧盟的政治环境影响了设计和执法力度，导致企业选择采用技术和博弈来减排。