Abstract

This article suggests that there may be scope to accommodate individual conscience whilst holding institutions to their full civil duties by making a structural distinction between institutions and individual members and employees. This distinction might circumvent the paralysing contrasts between more abstract human rights categories. This article approaches the question of conscience through the lens of a Dutch legislation on the position of wedding officials and in particular through a thorough critique of it by the Netherlands Council of State. The Council’s critique illuminates two important distinctions, first, between institutions and individuals and, second, between conscience and behaviour. These findings are potentially relevant in cases on access of lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) people to services provided by private companies. For example, may photographers and videographers deny services to same-sex couples? May a bakery decline to supply wedding cakes? May a bakery refuse to create a custom-made cake for an LGB event? These questions arose, respectively, in the US cases Elane Photography, Telescope, and Masterpiece cases as well as the British Ashers Bakery case. And, should a Christian law school’s accreditation be rejected when a code of conduct impairs access of LGB students, eg in the Canadian Trinity Western cases?

中文翻译：

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良心与蛋糕：重申机构职责与个人权利之间的区别

摘要

本文建议，通过在机构与个人成员和雇员之间进行结构上的区分，在使机构承担其全部民事职责的同时，可能还有一些容纳个人良知的空间。这种区分可能会绕开更抽象的人权类别之间的瘫痪对比。本文通过荷兰关于婚礼官员职位的立法的角度，特别是通过荷兰国务委员会的全面批评来探讨良心问题。安理会的批评阐明了两个重要的区别，首先是机构与个人之间的区别，其次是良心与行为之间的区别。这些发现在与女同性恋，男同性恋和双性恋（LGB）人使用私人公司提供的服务有关的案例中可能具有相关性。例如，摄影师和摄像师可以拒绝向同性伴侣提供服务吗？面包店会拒绝提供结婚蛋糕吗？面包店可以拒绝为LGB活动制作定制蛋糕吗？在美国案例中分别出现了这些问题Elane Photography，Telescope和Masterpiece盒，以及British Ashers Bakery盒。而且，如果行为准则妨碍了LGB学生的通行，例如在加拿大的Trinity Western案件中，是否应该拒绝基督教法学院的认证？