Abstract

The Supreme Court got it right in the Ashers (‘Gay cake’) case. It decided correctly the important legal issues central to the case: the scope of indissociability; the scope of ‘associative’ discrimination in sexual orientation goods and services discrimination claims; whose characteristics are relevant for determining whether an action amounts to unlawful discrimination; and the extent of the protection which freedom of expression accords individual service providers and companies from ‘forced’ or ‘compelled’ political and religious expression. Much of the critical commentary that followed the case is overblown. In some respects, the case is somewhat less legally significant, and less legally controversial, than the commentary would suggest. Underlying some of the resistance to the decision is a sense that the Court should have manipulated the legal test of unlawful discrimination to reach a morally satisfying result. This is not how the Court should decide such cases, leading as it does to a severe rupture with the idea of legality and the Rule of Law. In any event, the three (moral) arguments that are drawn on—dignity, equality, and conscience-scepticism—are less helpful that might appear in addressing Ashers-type cases, and do not undermine the normative foundations of the Supreme Court's decision.

中文翻译：

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同性恋蛋糕案：最高法院做了什么，没有做出Ashers的决定

摘要

最高法院在Ashers案中裁定正确（“同志蛋糕”）盒。它正确地决定了与案件有关的重要法律问题：不可分割的范围；性取向商品和服务歧视声明中“关联”歧视的范围；其特征与确定一项行动是否构成非法歧视有关；言论自由赋予个人服务提供者和公司免受“强迫”或“强迫”政治和宗教表达的保护程度。此案之后的许多批评性评论都被夸大了。从某些方面来说，此案在法律上意义不大，在法律上也没有争议那么多。对判决的某些抵触是在某种意义上说，法院应该操纵对非法歧视的法律检验，以达到道德上令人满意的结果。这不是法院应如何判决此类案件，因为它导致合法性和法治观念严重破裂。无论如何，尊严，平等和良心怀疑主义这三个（道德的）论点在解决问题时可能没有多大用处。Ashers类型的案件，并且不会损害最高法院判决的规范基础。