Abstract

In two recent cases, one in the USA and the other in the UK, courts have considered conscientious objection claims made by cake bakers who objected to providing a cake for the celebration/advocacy of same-sex marriage. I will argue that the issue in these cases is not the reasonable balance between the individual’s religious interests and the interests or rights of others in the community but is instead whether the individual’s religiously based objection should be viewed as an expression of personal religious conscience or as a (religiously grounded) civic position or action that falls outside the scope of religious freedom protection. In determining whether a conscientious objection should be viewed as a personal/spiritual matter or instead as a civic/political position, two factors are relevant. The first is whether the individual is being required to perform the particular act (to which she/he objects) because she/he holds a special position not held by others. The other factor is the relative remoteness/proximity of the act that the objector is required to perform from the act that she/he considers to be inherently immoral. The more remote the legally required action, the more likely we are to regard the objection as a political position.

中文翻译：

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出于良心拒服兵役与制饼政治

摘要

在最近的两个案件中，一个在美国，另一个在英国，法院考虑了蛋糕面包师的出于良心拒服兵役者，他们反对提供蛋糕来庆祝/倡导同性婚姻。我将争辩说，在这些情况下，问题不是个人的宗教利益与社区其他人的利益或权利之间的合理平衡，而是个人是否基于宗教信仰的反对应被视为个人宗教良心的表达或超出宗教自由保护范围的（基于宗教理由的）公民立场或行为。在确定是否应将依良心拒服兵役视为个人/精神问题还是作为公民/政治立场时，有两个因素相关。第一个是是否要求某人执行特定行为（她/他反对），因为她/他拥有别人没有担任的特殊职务。另一个因素是要求反对者从他/他认为本质上是不道德的行为中相对地接近/接近行为。法律要求采取的行动越遥远，我们就越有可能将反对意见视为政治立场。