Abstract

The paper discusses Ian Wells’s recent argument (Wells 2019) that there is a decision problem in which followers of Evidential Decision Theory end up poorer than followers of Causal Decision Theory despite having the same opportunities for money. It defends Evidential Decision Theory against Wells’s argument, on the following grounds. (i) Wells's has not presented a decision problem in which his main claim is true. (ii) Four possible decision problems can be generated from his central example, in each of which followers of Evidential Decision Theory do at least as well as followers of Causal Decision Theory (but the former typically have better opportunities for money). (iii) There is another case in which followers of Causal Decision Theory have the same opportunities for making money but end up worse than followers of Evidential Decision Theory.

中文翻译：

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纽康问题和其他地方的机会均等

摘要

本文讨论了伊恩·威尔斯（Ian Wells）的最新论点（Wells 2019），即存在一个决策问题，尽管有相同的金钱机会，但证据决策理论的追随者最终却比因果决策理论的追随者穷。它基于以下理由为反对韦尔斯的论点辩护的证据决策理论。（i）威尔斯没有提出他的主要主张是真实的决定问题。（ii）从他的中心例子可以得出四个可能的决策问题，在每个案例中，循证决策理论的追随者至少与因果决策理论的追随者一样做（但前者通常有更好的赚钱机会）。