Abstract

In the past two decades, epistemologists have significantly expanded the focus of their field. To the traditional question that has dominated the debate — under what conditions does belief amount to knowledge? — they have added questions about testimony, epistemic virtues and vices, epistemic trust, and more. This broadening of the range of epistemic concern has coincided with an expansion in conceptions of epistemic agency beyond the individualism characteristic of most earlier epistemology. We believe that these developments have not gone far enough. While the weak anti-individualism we see in contemporary epistemology may be adequate for the kinds of cases it tends to focus on, a great deal of human knowledge production and transmission does not conform to these models. Furthermore, the dispositions and norms that are knowledge-conducive in the familiar cases may not be knowledge-conducive generally. In fact, dispositions that, at an individual level, count as epistemic vices may be epistemic virtues in common social contexts. We argue that this overlooked feature of human social life means that epistemology must become more deeply and pervasively social.

中文翻译：

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恶习知识：深刻的社会认识论

摘要

在过去的二十年中，认识论者大大扩展了他们的研究领域。对于主导辩论的传统问题-信仰在什么情况下等于知识？-他们增加了有关证词，​​认知美德和恶行，认知信任等问题。认识论关注的范围不断扩大，同时认识论机构的概念也在扩展，超出了早期认识论的个人主义特征。我们认为，这些事态发展还远远不够。尽管我们在当代认识论中看到的弱的反个人主义可能足以应付它倾向于关注的各种情况，但大量的人类知识生产和传播却不符合这些模型。此外，在熟悉的情况下，有利于知识的配置和规范通常可能不有益于知识。实际上，在个体层面上被视为认识上的恶习的性格在共同的社会环境中可能是认识上的美德。我们认为，人类社会生活的这一被忽视的特征意味着认识论必须变得更加深入和普遍。