Abstract

This article studies how administrations seek to shape the federal workforce through the budget process. I develop a theory of personnel politics in which presidents balance ideological and interest group demands in distributing human resources across the federal government. I argue administrations advantage organizations with which they are ideologically aligned and that agencies with higher levels of union penetration see increased budgeted personnel levels, particularly during Democratic presidencies. Using an original dataset of budgeted personnel levels from fiscal years (FY) 1983–2016 and a series of regression analyses, I find strong support for these hypotheses. I also examine the sensitivity of presidential strategy to congressional preferences, agency professionalization, and leadership politicization, providing insights into how this control strategy interacts with the broader environment. Overall, these results have implications for understanding the political dynamics of human capital and capacity in the federal bureaucracy, the administrative presidency, and the politics of performance in federal agencies.

中文翻译：

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联邦预算程序中的意识形态，工会和人事政治

摘要

本文研究了政府部门如何通过预算流程寻求塑造联邦劳动力的方式。我发展了一种人事政治理论，在该理论中，总统在跨联邦政府分配人力资源时平衡了意识形态和利益集团的要求。我认为，行政当局有利于在意识形态上与之保持一致的组织，并且具有较高工会渗透水平的机构看到了增加的预算人员水平，尤其是在民主党担任总统期间。使用1983-2016财政年度（FY）预算人员水平的原始数据集以及一系列回归分析，我为这些假设提供了有力的支持。我还研究了总统战略对国会偏好，机构专业化和领导政治化的敏感性，提供有关此控制策略如何与更广泛的环境交互的见解。总体而言，这些结果对理解联邦机构中的人力资本和能力的政治动态，行政职务以及联邦机构的绩效政治具有启示意义。