Twelve of twenty-six war-winning coalitions since 1815 have seen at least two members go to war against one another after victory. What separates durable and fragile war-winning coalitions? To answer this question, we analyze a game-theoretic model of shifting intra-coalition power and collective deterrence. We show that (1) shifting power within war-winning coalitions can undermine commitments to the postwar settlement, but (2) revisionist threats from a powerful defeated side can enhance the credibility of commitments within the winning coalition, securing peace when intra-coalition war would otherwise be inevitable. We also recover these patterns in empirical models of the outbreak of war between former coalition partners: shifting power within a coalition is associated with increased probabilities of intra-coalition war, but only when the defeated side is not too powerful. A common enemy can thus preserve peace between former partners who would otherwise go to war over the terms of shared victory.

中文翻译：

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权力转移阴影下的集体威慑

自 1815 年以来，在 26 个赢得战争的联盟中，有 12 个至少有两个成员在胜利后相互交战。是什么将持久和脆弱的赢得战争的联盟区分开来？为了回答这个问题，我们分析了联盟内部权力和集体威慑转移的博弈论模型。我们表明（1）在获胜联盟内部转移权力会破坏对战后解决方案的承诺，但（2）来自强大战败一方的修正主义威胁可以提高获胜联盟内部承诺的可信度，从而在联盟内部发生战争时确保和平否则将是不可避免的。我们还在前联盟伙伴之间爆发战争的经验模型中恢复了这些模式：联盟内部的权力转移与联盟内部战争的可能性增加有关，但只有当被击败的一方不是太强大时。因此，一个共同的敌人可以维护前伙伴之间的和平，否则他们会为了共同胜利而开战。