In most contemporary civil wars, governments collude with non-state militias as part of their counterinsurgent strategy. However, governments also restrict the capabilities of their militia allies despite the adverse consequences this may have on their overall counterinsurgent capabilities. Why do governments contain their militia allies while also fighting a rebellion? I argue that variation in militia containment during a civil war is the outcome of a bargaining process over future bargaining power between security or profit-seeking militias and states with time-inconsistent preferences. Strong states and states facing weak rebellions cannot credibly commit to not suppressing their militias, and militias with sufficient capabilities to act independently cannot credibly commit to not betraying the state. States with limited political reach and those facing strong rebellions, however, must retain militia support, which opens a “window of opportunity” for militias to augment their independent capabilities and future bargaining power. Using new data on pro-government militia containment and case illustrations of the Janjaweed in Sudan and Civil Defense Patrols in Guatemala, I find evidence consistent with these claims. Future work must continue to incorporate the agency of militias when studying armed politics, since these bargaining interactions constitute a fundamental yet undertheorized characteristic of war-torn states.

中文翻译：

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内战中的民兵遏制之谜

在大多数当代内战中，政府与非国家民兵勾结，作为其平叛战略的一部分。然而，政府也限制其民兵盟友的能力，尽管这可能对其整体反叛乱能力产生不利影响。为什么政府要遏制他们的民兵盟友，同时还要打击叛乱？我认为，内战期间民兵遏制的变化是安全或营利民兵与具有时间不一致偏好的国家之间关于未来议价能力的讨价还价过程的结果。强大的国家和面对弱小的叛乱的国家不能令人信服地承诺不镇压民兵，有足够能力独立行动的民兵不能令人信服地承诺不背叛国家。然而，政治影响力有限的国家和面临强烈叛乱的国家必须保留民兵的支持，这为民兵打开了“机会之窗”，以增强其独立能力和未来的议价能力。使用关于亲政府民兵遏制的新数据以及苏丹金戈威德和危地马拉民防巡逻队的案例说明，我发现证据与这些说法一致。在研究武装政治时，未来的工作必须继续纳入民兵机构，因为这些讨价还价的互动构成了饱受战争蹂躏的国家的基本但理论不足的特征。使用关于亲政府民兵遏制的新数据以及苏丹金戈威德和危地马拉民防巡逻队的案例说明，我发现证据与这些说法一致。在研究武装政治时，未来的工作必须继续纳入民兵机构，因为这些讨价还价的互动构成了饱受战争蹂躏的国家的基本但理论不足的特征。使用关于亲政府民兵遏制的新数据以及苏丹金戈威德和危地马拉民防巡逻队的案例说明，我发现证据与这些说法一致。在研究武装政治时，未来的工作必须继续纳入民兵机构，因为这些讨价还价的互动构成了饱受战争蹂躏的国家的基本但理论不足的特征。