States often use covert operations to undermine their adversaries. This strategy involves, among other methods, intelligence organizations directing and supporting the operations of covert networks residing within the target state. This was a common occurrence during the Cold War, but covert clients also operate in modern conflicts in Syria, Ukraine, and elsewhere. This paper introduces and defines covert clients as a distinct and novel concept. We then use original data on more than 250 clandestine networks within the French Resistance to investigate the determinants of covert client success and failure. We find that clients founded by foreign operatives inserted into the target state fail at significantly higher rates than those that establish themselves organically within the target state, although this effect diminishes among stronger groups. We corroborate these findings with a case study of the Prosper network to demonstrate how clandestine group origins influence their local knowledge, incentives, and security practices. This study uses original data to provide novel insights into clandestine group survival by linking survival to group origins. In demonstrating the potential utility of focusing on the conduct of covert operations, we also contribute to a rapidly growing international relations literature on how states project power through covert action.

中文翻译：

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阴影中的敌人：关于秘密客户的起源和生存

国家经常使用秘密行动来削弱他们的对手。除其他方法外，该战略还包括指导和支持驻留在目标国家内的秘密网络的运作的情报组织。这在冷战期间很常见，但秘密客户也在叙利亚、乌克兰和其他地方的现代冲突中运作。本文介绍并将隐蔽客户定义为一个独特而新颖的概念。然后，我们使用法国抵抗组织内 250 多个秘密网络的原始数据来调查秘密客户成功和失败的决定因素。我们发现，由插入目标国家的外国特工建立的客户的失败率明显高于那些在目标国家有机地建立自己的客户，尽管这种影响在更强大的群体中会减弱。我们通过 Prosper 网络的案例研究证实了这些发现，以展示秘密团体的起源如何影响他们的本地知识、激励措施和安全实践。本研究通过将生存与群体起源联系起来，使用原始数据提供对秘密群体生存的新见解。在展示专注于秘密行动的潜在效​​用时，我们还为迅速增长的关于国家如何通过秘密行动投射权力的国际关系文献做出了贡献。