Abstract

Previous studies have highlighted that United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations are effective at reducing violence during civil wars. But can these operations also change the incentives of the warring parties and lead them to pursue non-violent alternatives? This article provides the first direct test of UN peacekeeping troops’ effectiveness at inducing non-violent engagements, specifically negotiations during civil wars. Our analysis of disaggregated monthly data on peace operations, negotiations, and violence in African conflicts (1989–2009) reveals that sizable deployments of UN military troops, by themselves, are insufficient to foster negotiations, even when they reduce battlefield violence. Instead, the probability of negotiation instances is conditional on rebel tactics. We posit, when rebels engage in terrorism, peacekeeping troops can inadvertently alter the “power to hurt” of the belligerents in favor of rebel groups and create conditions conducive to negotiations. Our results have important implications for research on the effectiveness of both peacekeeping and terrorism and for policy-making.

中文翻译：

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创造和平还是预防和平？联合国维持和平，恐怖主义与内战谈判

摘要

先前的研究强调，联合国维持和平行动在减少内战期间的暴力方面是有效的。但是，这些行动是否还能改变交战方的动机，并促使他们寻求非暴力替代方案？本文首次直接检验了联合国维和部队在诱导非暴力交往方面的效力，特别是在内战期间的谈判。我们对有关非洲冲突中的和平行动，谈判和暴力（1989-2009）的月度分类数据的分析表明，即使减少了战场暴力，联合国军的庞大部署本身也不足以促进谈判。相反，谈判实例的可能性取决于反叛战术。我们认为，当叛乱分子从事恐怖主义活动时，维和部队可以无意中改变交战国的“伤害权”，以支持叛乱团体，并创造有利于谈判的条件。我们的结果对关于维持和平与恐怖主义的有效性的研究以及对政策制定都具有重要的意义。