Abstract

Leadership turnover brings to office new leaders with private reputational incentives to bluff about their resolve, incentivizing both incumbents and their foreign rivals to take steps that increase the risk of war. Some leader changes, however, are more dangerous than others. The turnover trap arises when there is sufficient uncertainty about a new leader's resolve and expectations of future interactions, and whether those factors coincide depends on how new leaders come to power and the political system in which its turnover occurs. We expect that those instances of leader change most likely to generate turnover traps entail (1) democratic incumbents unconnected to their predecessor's support coalition and (2) autocratic incumbents that inherit their predecessors' coalitions. In a sample of strategic rivals from 1918-2007, we find that the probability of dispute escalation declines over leaders' tenure, but only for the two types of turnover we identify as most dangerous.

中文翻译：

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和老老板一样吗？国内政治与离职陷阱

摘要

领导层的流动使新领导者获得了私人声誉的奖励，虚张声势地决心解决他们的决心，激励在职者和他们的外国竞争对手采取增加战争风险的措施。但是，某些领导者更替比其他更危险。当新领导人的决心和对未来互动的期望存在足够的不确定性时，就会出现离职陷阱，而这些因素是否重合取决于新领导人上台的方式以及其离职发生的政治制度。我们预计，这些领导人变动的情况最有可能产生人员流动陷阱，这需要（1）与前任支持联盟无关的民主在位者，以及（2）继承其前任联盟的专制现任者。在1918-2007年的战略竞争对手样本中，