Abstract

Like other epistemic activities, inquiry seems to be governed by norms. Some have argued that one such norm forbids us from believing the answer to a question and inquiring into it at the same time. But another, hither-to neglected norm seems to permit just this sort of cognitive arrangement when we seek to confirm what we currently believe. In this paper, I suggest that both norms are plausible and that the conflict between them constitutes a puzzle. Drawing on the felicity conditions of confirmation requests and the biased interrogatives used to perform them, I argue that the puzzle is genuine. I conclude by considering a response to the puzzle that has implications for the debate regarding the relationship between credences and beliefs.

中文翻译：

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寻求确认：询问规范的难题

摘要

像其他认知活动一样，探究似乎也受制于规范。一些人认为，这样的规范禁止我们相信问题的答案并同时进行询问。但是，当我们试图确认我们目前所相信的东西时，另一个迄今为止被忽略的规范似乎只允许这种认知方式。在本文中，我建议这两个规范都是合理的，并且它们之间的冲突构成了一个难题。利用确认请求的适当条件以及用于执行确认请求的偏颇疑问句，我认为这个谜题是真实的。在结束时，我首先考虑了对这个难题的回应，这对有关信任与信念之间关系的辩论产生了影响。