There is little agreement among moral and political philosophers when it comes to determining what it is that makes adaptive preferences problematic. The large number of competing explanations offered by philosophers illustrates the absence of any consensus. The most prominent versions of these explanations have recently come under attack by Dale Dorsey, who argues that adaptive preferences are a red herring: the problematic nature of adaptive preferences is not explained by the fact of adaptation but by an appeal to some other normative consideration. In this article I offer an account of adaptive preferences that both accommodates the thought that only some of our adaptive preferences are problematic and responds to the skeptical challenge pressed by Dorsey. I argue that some adaptive preferences are prima facie irrational as they exhibit a peculiar error in reasoning where individuals change the semantic content of the reasons underpinning the new preference.

中文翻译：

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自适应偏好的非理性：心理和语义解释

在确定是什么使适应性偏好成为问题时，道德和政治哲学家之间几乎没有达成一致意见。哲学家提供的大量相互竞争的解释说明没有任何共识。这些解释的最突出的版本最近受到了戴尔·多尔西的攻击，他认为适应性偏好是一条红鲱鱼：适应性偏好的问题性质不是通过适应的事实来解释，而是通过诉诸其他一些规范性考虑来解释。在这篇文章中，我提供了一个关于适应性偏好的说明，它既适应了只有我们的一些适应性偏好是有问题的想法，又回应了 Dorsey 提出的怀疑挑战。我认为一些适应性偏好是表面上非理性的，因为它们在推理中表现出特殊的错误，即个体改变支持新偏好的原因的语义内容。