In this article, I respond to Augustin Fragnière's recent attempt to understand the demandingness of individual climate duties by appealing to the difference between “concentrated” harm and “spread” harm and the importance of “moral thresholds”. I suggest his arguments don't succeed in securing the conclusion he is after, even from within his own commitments, which themselves are problematic. As this is primarily a critical project, the upshot of this discussion is that if there is a defensible way to justify the intuition that the duty to reduce emissions can't be overly demanding, it has to be found elsewhere.

中文翻译：

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个人气候责任的要求：对 Fragnière 的回应

在这篇文章中，我回应了 Augustin Fragnière 最近试图通过诉诸“集中”伤害和“传播”伤害之间的区别以及“道德门槛”的重要性来理解个人气候责任的要求。我认为他的论点并没有成功地得出他所追求的结论，即使是在他自己的承诺中，这本身就是有问题的。由于这主要是一个关键项目，因此本次讨论的结果是，如果有一种合理的方式来证明减少排放的责任不能过于苛刻的直觉，那么就必须在其他地方找到它。