It is commonly thought that disability is a harm or “bad difference” because having a disability restricts valuable options in life. In his recent essay “Disability, Options and Well-Being,” Thomas Crawley offers a novel defense of this style of reasoning (formulated as the Options Argument) and argues that we and like-minded critics of this brand of argument are guilty of an inconsistency. Our aim in this article is to explain why our view avoids inconsistency, to challenge Crawley's positive defense of the Options Argument, and to suggest that this general line of reasoning employs a double standard.

中文翻译：

---

如何（始终如一地）拒绝选项参数

人们普遍认为残疾是一种伤害或“坏区别”，因为残疾限制了生活中有价值的选择。在他最近的文章“残疾、选择和幸福”中，托马斯克劳利为这种推理风格（被表述为选择论证）提供了一个新颖的辩护，并认为我们和这种观点的志同道合的批评者都犯了一个错误。不一致。我们在这篇文章中的目的是解释为什么我们的观点避免了不一致，挑战克劳利对期权论证的积极辩护，并表明这种一般的推理路线采用了双重标准。