To consequentialize a deontological moral theory is to give a theory which issues the same moral verdicts, but explains those verdicts in terms of maximizing or satisficing value. There are many motivations for consequentializing: to reconcile plausible ideas behind deontology with plausible ideas behind consequentialism, to help us better understand deontological theories, or to extend deontological theories beyond what intuitions alone tell us. It has proven difficult to consequentialize theories that allow for moral dilemmas or that deny that “ought” implies “can.” This article argues that the problem is best solved by allowing impossible actions as inputs into consequentializations. It shows that all other approaches that have been advocated are inadequate. It also argues that progress in consequentialization, and in formal ethics more generally, requires thinking about more than just wrongness and permissibility; we should think about contrary-to-duty obligations and degrees of wrongness as well.

中文翻译：

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为什么不可能的选择更好：导致困境

将一种道义论的道德理论结果化，就是给出一种理论，该理论发表相同的道德裁决，但根据最大化或满足价值来解释这些裁决。后果化的动机有很多：调和道义论背后的合理观点与后果论背后的合理观点，帮助我们更好地理解道义理论，或者将道义理论扩展到仅凭直觉告诉我们的范围之外。事实证明，对允许道德困境或否认“应该”意味着“可以”的理论进行结果分析是很困难的。本文认为，最好通过将不可能的动作作为结果化的输入来解决该问题。这表明所有其他提倡的方法都是不充分的。它还认为，结果化方面的进展，在更普遍的形式伦理学中，需要考虑的不仅仅是错误和可允许性；我们还应该考虑违反职责的义务和错误程度。