In the literature on toleration, epistemic arguments are commonly equated with John Stuart Mill's fallibilism according to which toleration of opinions is a necessary means to the attainment of truth. This conflation does not capture the variety of those arguments and it results from the fact that a proper analysis of epistemic arguments for religious toleration and a systematic account of their different types are still lacking. The purpose of this article is to provide such an analysis and to argue that those arguments come in four different types, which I name fallibilism, religious belief-forming process, epistemic parity, and differentiated access to religious truth or divine message. I also offer a mapping of those different types of arguments using the standard epistemic notions of justification, truth, and belief coupled with a distinction of focus in the epistemological approach – whether individually or socially focused.

中文翻译：

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绘制宗教宽容的认知论据

在关于宽容的文献中，认识论论证通常等同于约翰·斯图尔特·密尔的谬误论，根据这种谬误论，对意见的宽容是获得真理的必要手段。这种混为一谈并没有捕捉到这些论点的多样性，这是因为仍然缺乏对宗教宽容的认识论论据的适当分析以及对它们不同类型的系统说明。本文的目的是提供这样的分析，并论证这些论点有四种不同的类型，我将其命名为易错论、宗教信仰形成过程、认识平等，以及对宗教真理或神圣信息的不同访问。我还使用证明、真理、