The evil-god challenge holds that theism is highly symmetrical to the evil-god hypothesis and thus it is not more reasonable to accept one rather than the other. But, since it is not reasonable to accept the evil-god hypothesis, it is not reasonable to accept theism. This article will primarily focus on defending the challenge from two recent objections which hold that it follows from the nature of moral motivation that theism is intrinsically much more likely to be true than the evil-god hypothesis. However, I will also argue that there is a different intrinsic asymmetry between the hypotheses which favours theism.

中文翻译：

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道德动机与邪神挑战

邪神挑战认为有神论与邪神假说高度对称，因此接受一个而不是另一个更合理。但是，既然接受邪神假说是不合理的，那么接受有神论也是不合理的。本文将主要针对最近的两个反对意见进行辩护，这些反对意见认为，从道德动机的本质来看，有神论在本质上比邪神假说更有可能是真实的。然而，我还将争辩说，有利于有神论的假设之间存在不同的内在不对称性。