What should one do when one's philosophical conclusions run counter to common sense? Bow to the might of ordinary opinion or follow the indiscriminate force of philosophical reason, no matter where it leads? A few strategies have recently been proposed which suggest we needn't have to make this difficult choice at all. According to these views, we can accept the truths of common sense whilst simultaneously endorsing philosophical views with which they seem to conflict. We can, for instance, accept it as true that the Taj Mahal is in India, whilst also eliminating the Taj Mahal from our ontology. I argue that these strategies generate a new conflict with common sense and thus undercut one of the central motivations that drives them. I also argue for the stronger claim that these kinds of ‘truth-salvaging’ strategy are incapable in principle of reconciling theory with common sense. This does not mean that they must be abandoned, for there may be good independent reasons for endorsing them, but it does eliminate one of their most promising advantages. The upshot of the paper will be two-fold. First, one of the major motivations for endorsing these kinds of strategy will be severely undermined. Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, it will mean that for those who think philosophy should be strictly constrained by common sense, all radical ontological views will effectively be off the table.

中文翻译：

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从本体废料中挽救真相

当一个人的哲学结论与常识背道而驰时该怎么办？屈服于普通意见的威力，还是追随哲学理性的不分青红皂白的力量，无论它通向何方？最近提出了一些策略，表明我们根本不必做出这个艰难的选择。根据这些观点，我们可以接受常识的真理，同时支持与它们似乎相冲突的哲学观点。例如，我们可以接受泰姬陵位于印度这一事实，同时也将泰姬陵从我们的本体中剔除。我认为这些策略与常识产生了新的冲突，从而削弱了驱动它们的核心动机之一。我还支持更强有力的主张，即这些“挽救真相”的策略是无能为力的原则上调和理论与常识。这并不意味着必须放弃它们，因为支持它们可能有很好的独立理由，但这确实消除了它们最有希望的优势之一。本文的结果将是双重的。首先，支持此类战略的主要动机之一将受到严重破坏。其次，也许更重要的是，这意味着对于那些认为哲学应该受到常识严格约束的人来说，所有激进的本体论观点都将被有效地排除在外。