A well-established tradition has argued that it is not legitimate to attribute to Parmenides a Fregean semantics, i.e. the distinction between ‘naming’ and ‘meaning’. Nonetheless, Parmenides claims more than once (B 8.53, B 9.1) that mortals do name reality, although incorrectly. As many scholars have emphasised, because it is fair neither to conclude that mortals’ names are ‘empty names’ nor dismiss Opinion's account (i.e., broadly speaking, the mortals’ account of reality) itself as meaningless, it seems that Parmenides is suggesting that some kind of distinction between what names refer to and what names mean must be drawn. In view of this, what is Parmenides’ account of names?My suggestion is that in order to explain the Eleatic philosophy of language (and the Eleatic account of names) a step back is required. More specifically, Parmenides’ epistemology has to be taken into account. Indeed, if we assume that Parmenides is arguing for an ‘epistemological disjunctivism’ – such that the veridical and truthful state and the erroneous and deceptive state are essentially different – it will be clear that he is further arguing for what could be defined as a ‘semantic disjunctivism’, so that true speech and false speech are essentially different as well.

中文翻译：

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巴门尼德论“命名”和“意义”：对诗歌的析取主义解读

一个公认的传统认为，将弗雷格语义学归于巴门尼德是不合理的，即“命名”和“意义”之间的区别。尽管如此，巴门尼德不止一次（B 8.53，B 9.1）声称凡人做名字现实，虽然不正确。正如许多学者所强调的那样，因为既不能得出结论说凡人的名字是“空名”，也不能将 Opinion 的解释（即广义上说，凡人对现实的解释）本身视为毫无意义，所以巴门尼德似乎是在暗示：必须在名称所指的内容和名称的含义之间做出某种区分。鉴于此，巴门尼德对名称的解释是什么？我的建议是，为了解释 Eleatic 语言哲学（以及 Eleatic 名称的解释），需要退后一步。更具体地说，必须考虑巴门尼德的认识论。确实，