Challenging the common image of Hume as a thoroughly secular philosopher, I argue that Hume occasionally relied on the design argument to defend the objectivity of values. Hume acknowledged that rejecting design might open the door to aesthetic, ethical, and epistemic relativism. To avoid this prospect, he allowed himself to repurpose the language of providential naturalists like Hutcheson and claim that “nature,” rather than God, has attuned our faculties to objective standards of morals, beauty, and truth. Historians of philosophy have treated such passages as merely figurative, as they conflict with fundamental principles in Hume's philosophy. I argue instead, from an intellectual historical perspective, that Hume nonetheless expects the passages to be read literally, since only the literal reading helps his case against relativism. Rather than recasting Hume as a defender of design, however, I argue that his appeals to design were less an integral part of his philosophy than a provisional compromise, a response to intractable tensions in the history of secularism.

中文翻译：

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在相对主义与设计之间：休谟世俗性的局限

挑战休谟作为彻底世俗哲学家的普遍形象，我认为休谟偶尔会依靠设计论据来捍卫价值观的客观性。休谟承认拒绝设计可能会为审美、伦理和认知相对主义打开大门。为了避免这种前景，他允许自己重新使用像哈奇森这样的天意博物学家的语言，并声称“自然”而不是上帝，已经使我们的能力适应了道德、美和真理的客观标准。哲学史家认为这些段落仅仅是比喻性的，因为它们与休谟哲学中的基本原则相冲突。相反，我认为，从知识的历史角度来看，休谟仍然希望这些段落被逐字阅读，因为只有逐字阅读才能帮助他反对相对主义。