This paper develops a moderate pessimist account of moral deference. I argue that while some pessimist explanations of the puzzle of moral deference have been misguided in matters of detail, they nevertheless share an important insight, namely that there is a justified moral agency ideal grounded in pro tanto reasons against moral deference. This thought is unpacked in terms of a set of values associated with the practice of morality. I conclude by suggesting that the solution to the puzzle of moral deference developed here gives us a plausible recipe for generalizing to certain cases of nonmoral deference as well.

中文翻译：

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实践能动性的顺从与理想

本文对道德顺从提出了一种温和的悲观主义解释。我认为，虽然一些对道德顺从之谜的悲观主义解释在细节问题上被误导了，但它们仍然有一个重要的见解，即存在一个合理的道德能动性理想，其基础是原唐托反对道德尊重的理由。这种思想是根据与道德实践相关的一组价值观来展开的。最后，我建议这里提出的解决道德尊重难题的方法为我们提供了一个合理的秘诀，可以推广到某些非道德尊重的案例。