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Two Kinds of Imaginative Vividness
Canadian Journal of Philosophy ( IF 1.7 ) Pub Date : 2021-02-08 , DOI: 10.1017/can.2020.54
Julia Langkau

This paper argues that we should distinguish two different kinds of imaginative vividness: vividness of mental images and vividness of imaginative experiences. Philosophy has focussed on mental images, but distinguishing more complex vivid imaginative experiences from vivid mental images can help us understand our intuitions concerning the notion as well as the explanatory power of vividness. In particular, it can help us understand the epistemic role imagination can play on the one hand and our emotional engagement with literary fiction on the other hand.

中文翻译:

两种想象的生动

本文认为,我们应该区分两种不同的想象生动性:心理图像的生动性和想象经验的生动性。哲学专注于心理图像,但将更复杂的生动想象经验与生动的心理图像区分开来,可以帮助我们理解我们对概念的直觉以及生动的解释力。特别是,它一方面可以帮助我们理解想象可以发挥的认知作用,另一方面可以帮助我们理解我们对文学小说的情感参与。
更新日期:2021-02-08
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