Several science studies scholars report instances of scientific “hype,” or sensationalized exaggeration, in journal articles, institutional press releases, and science journalism in a variety of fields (e.g., Caulfield and Condit 2012). Yet, how “hype” is being conceived varies. I will argue that hype is best understood as a particular kind of exaggeration, one that explicitly or implicitly exaggerates various positive aspects of science in ways that undermine the goals of science communication in a particular context. This account also makes clear the ways that value judgments play a role in judgments of “hype,” which has implications for detecting and addressing this problem.

一些科学研究学者在期刊文章、机构新闻稿和科学新闻的各个领域（例如，Caulfield 和 Condit 2012）中报告了科学“炒作”或耸人听闻的夸大的实例。然而，“炒作”的构思方式各不相同。我将争辩说，炒作最好被理解为一种特殊的夸大其词，明确或隐含地夸大科学的各种积极方面，从而破坏特定背景下的科学传播目标。该说明还清楚地说明了价值判断在“炒作”判断中发挥作用的方式，这对于发现和解决这个问题具有重要意义。