Science is based on facts—facts that are systematically gathered by a community of enquirers through detailed observation and experiment. In the twentieth century, however, philosophers of science claimed that the facts that scientists “gather” in this way are shaped by the theories scientists accept, and this seemed to threaten the authority of science. Call this the old worries about science. By contrast, what seemed not to threaten that authority were other factors that shaped the facts that scientists gather—for example, the mere questions scientists pursue. Call this the old nonworries about science. What I suggest is that the old nonworries are turning out to be far more worrisome than the old worries, and I use recent goings-on such as the “Death of Evidence” protests in Canada, the “replication crisis,” and the ongoing feminist critiques of science to illustrate my case. All this raises interesting new questions for philosophers of science to tackle.

科学以事实为基础——由一群询问者通过详细的观察和实验系统地收集的事实。然而，在 20 世纪，科学哲学家声称，科学家以这种方式“收集”的事实是由科学家所接受的理论所塑造的，这似乎威胁到了科学的权威。把这称为对科学的古老担忧。相比之下，似乎不会威胁到这一权威的是其他因素，这些因素塑造了科学家们收集的事实——例如，科学家们所追求的单纯的问题。把这称为对科学的古老无忧。我的建议是，旧的不担忧比旧的担忧更令人担忧，我使用最近发生的事情，例如加拿大的“证据死亡”抗议活动、“复制危机”和正在进行的女权主义科学批评来说明我的情况。所有这些都为科学哲学家提出了有趣的新问题。