To cope with the uncertainty of labor supply from freelance/self-scheduling drivers, some ride-sourcing platforms recruit contractual drivers, who are paid a fixed salary for pre-specified work schedules. This paper develops an aggregate modeling framework to examine the practicability of such a dual-sourcing strategy. We investigate the optimal contract design of dual sourcing under demand uncertainty, varying price sensitivity of freelancers, and heterogeneity in drivers’ risk attitude. Our results uncover the conditions under which dual sourcing benefits both the platform and drivers. We show that the platform’s staffing and pricing decisions are most responsive to freelancers’ price sensitivity. When the price sensitivity stays adequately low, both the platform and drivers can be better off under dual sourcing compared to the self-scheduling counterpart. On the contrary, with moderate price sensitivity, freelancers will be made worse off by dual sourcing. The dual-sourcing contracts are most effective in markets where drivers are risk-averse.

为了应对自由职业者/自定日程安排司机的劳动力供应的不确定性，一些拼车采购平台招募了合同司机，他们为预定的工作时间表支付固定的薪水。本文开发了一个总体建模框架，以检验这种双重采购策略的实用性。我们研究了在需求不确定性，自由职业者对价格的敏感性不同以及驾驶员风险态度存在异质性的情况下，双重采购的最优合同设计。我们的结果揭示了双重采购有利于平台和驱动程序的条件。我们表明，平台的人员配备和定价决策最能响应自由职业者的价格敏感性。当价格敏感度保持在足够低的水平时，与自调度对手相比，在双重采购下平台和驱动程序都可以更好。相反，在中等价格敏感性的情况下，双重采购会使自由职业者的处境更糟。双重采购合同在驱动程序规避风险的市场中最有效。