We investigate a number of canonical predictions that arise from relational contract theory. Employing an experimental design with endogenous choice of contract type, we find considerable experimental support for several well-established predictions, including the importance of self-enforcement and individual rationality constraints for contractual performance; a preference for informal agreements when third-party verification of performance is coarse; and a tendency toward strategic ambiguity (Bernheim and Whinston Am Econ Rev 902–932). However, two findings that appear to be inconsistent with theory are that (1) contractually specified performance levels do not appear to respond to the discount factor though realized performance does; and (2) subjects often apply inefficient punishments following a deviation. By providing evidence on the strengths and weaknesses of standard relational contract theory, our study shows where there is room for improvement. We conjecture that incorporating social preferences and semi-grim strategies (Breitmoser Am Econ Rev 105(9): 2882–2910) can potentially address the observed weaknesses.

我们调查了由关系契约理论引起的许多规范的预测。通过对合同类型进行内生选择的实验设计，我们发现了对一些公认的预测的相当多的实验支持，包括自我执行的重要性和个体合理性对合同履行的重要性；当第三方对性能进行粗略验证时，倾向于非正式协议；以及战略上的歧义倾向（Bernheim and Whinston Am Econ Rev 902–932）。但是，有两个发现似乎与理论不符：（1）合同规定的绩效水平似乎并没有对折现因子作出反应，尽管已实现的绩效确实对折现因子有反应；（2）受测者经常会在偏离后施加低效的惩罚。通过提供标准关系合同理论的优缺点的证据，我们的研究表明了仍有改进空间。我们推测，将社会偏好和半格策略结合起来（Breitmoser Am Econ Rev 105（9）：2882-2910）可以潜在地解决所观察到的弱点。