A common objection to divine command meta-ethics (‘DCM’) is the horrendous deeds objection. Critics object that if DCM is true, anything at all could be right, no matter how abhorrent or horrendous. Defenders of DCM have responded by contending that God is essentially good: God has certain character traits essentially, such as being loving and just. A person with these character traits cannot command just anything. In recent discussions of DCM, this ‘essential goodness response’ has come under fire. Critics of DCM have offered various objections to the essential goodness response. This paper responds to these critics. I examine and refute six such objections: (a) the objection from counterpossibles, (b) the objection from omnipotence, (c) the objection from requirements of justice, (d) the objection from God’s moral grounding power, (e) the objection from evil and indifferent deities, and (f) the epistemological objection. I will maintain that despite all that has been said about the horrendous deeds objection in recent analytic philosophy, the horrendous deeds argument is still a bad argument.

对神圣的命令元伦理学（'DCM'）的普遍反对是可怕的行为反对。批评者反对，如果DCM为true，那么无论多么可恶或可怕，任何事情都可能是正确的。DCM的捍卫者回应说，上帝本质上是善良的：上帝本质上具有某些性格特征，例如爱心和公正。具有这些人格特质的人不能指挥任何事情。在DCM的最新讨论中，这种“基本善良响应”受到了抨击。DCM的批评者对基本善良响应提出了各种异议。本文回应了这些批评家。我审查并驳斥了六种此类反对意见：（a）来自可能的反对者，（b）来自全能的反对者，（c）来自正义的要求的反对者，（d）来自上帝的道德基础力量的反对者，（e）来自邪恶和冷漠神灵的反对，以及（f）认识论上的反对。我将坚持认为，尽管在最近的分析哲学中已经对恐怖行为的反对意见做了很多论述，但恐怖行为的论点仍然是一个不好的论点。