Doxasticism is the view that propositional faith that p entails belief that p. This view has recently come under fire within analytic philosophy of religion. One common objection is that faith is compatible with doubt in a way that belief is not. One version of this objection, recently employed by Beth Rath (International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 81, 161–169, 2017), is to use a particular story, in this case Jesus Christ’s cry of dereliction, to argue that someone had propositional faith while ceasing to believe. Thus, doxasticism is false. Rath’s approach of analyzing a case from scripture has the advantage of allowing her to provide evidence for the claim that a subject had propositional faith but lost belief. However, I argue that Rath faces a dilemma: on the interpretation of the passage necessary for her argument, either Christ did lose his propositional faith that God was with him, or else he did not lose his belief that God was with him. Either way, she must reject a key premise in her argument.

Doxasticism认为，命题的信念，p需要信念，p。这种观点最近在宗教分析哲学中受到抨击。一个普遍的反对意见是，信念与怀疑是相容的，而信念却是不相容的。这种异议的一种形式，最近由贝丝·拉斯（Beth Rath）使用（国际宗教哲学杂志，81岁，（161-169，2017），是要使用一个特定的故事，在这种情况下是耶稣基督的失信诉求，来争辩某人在停止信仰的同时就拥有了命题信仰。因此，夸张主义是错误的。拉斯从经文中分析一个案例的方法的优势在于，可以让她提供证据，证明某人具有命题信仰，但失去了信仰。但是，我认为拉斯面临一个难题：在解释她的论点所必需的段落时，要么基督确实失去了他与上帝同在的命题信念，要么他没有失去对上帝与他同在的信念。无论哪种方式，她都必须拒绝其论点中的关键前提。