This paper reconsiders the notion that Nagarjuna and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus may only be seen as comparable under a shared ineffability thesis, that is, the idea that reality is impossible to describe in sensible discourse. Historically, Nagarjuna and the early Wittgenstein have both been widely construed as offering either metaphysical theories or attempts to refute all such theories. Instead, by employing an interpretive framework based on a ‘resolute’ reading of the Tractatus, I suggest we see their philosophical affinity in terms of a shared conception of philosophical method without proposing theses. In doing so, this offers us a new way to understand Nagarjuna’s characteristic claims both to have ‘no views’ (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 13.8 and 27.30) and refusal to accept that things exist ‘inherently’ or with ‘essence’ (svabhāva). Therefore, instead of either a view about the nature of a mind-independent ‘ultimate reality’ or a thesis concerning the rejection of such a domain, I propose that we understand Nagarjuna’s primary aim as ‘therapeutic’, that is, concerned with the dissolution of philosophical problems. However, this ‘therapy’ should neither be confined to the psychotherapeutic metaphor nor should it be taken to imply a private enlightenment only available to philosophers. Instead, for Nagarjuna and Wittgenstein, philosophical problems are cast as a source of disquiet for all of us; what their work offers is a soteriology, a means towards our salvation.

本文反思的概念，龙树和维特根斯坦的逻辑哲学论只能共享不可言喻的论文在被看作是相当的，也就是说，这个想法现实是不可能在合理的话语形容。从历史上看，纳加朱纳和维特根斯坦早期都被广泛地解释为提供形而上学理论或试图驳斥所有这些理论。相反，通过采用基于“坚决”阅读的解释框架逻辑哲学论，我认为我们看到了哲学方法的共同观念方面他们的哲学亲和力没有提出论文。这样，这为我们提供了一种新的方式来理解Nagarjuna的特征性主张，即它们都“无视”（Mūlamadhyamakakārikā13.8和27.30），拒绝接受事物“固有地”或“本质”存在（svabhāva）。因此，我建议不要理解独立于心灵的“终极现实”的本质，也不愿提出关于拒绝这种领域的论点，而建议我们理解纳加朱纳的主要目标是“治疗”，即与解散有关。哲学问题。但是，这种“疗法”既不应局限于心理治疗的隐喻，也不应被认为暗示着只有哲学家可以得到的私人启蒙。相反，对于纳加朱纳和维特根斯坦而言，哲学问题被认为是困扰我们所有人的根源。他们的工作所提供的是社会学，是我们得救的一种手段。