In recent years, a disagreement has erupted between two camps of philosophers about the rationality of bias toward the near (“near bias”) and bias toward the future (“future bias”). According to the traditional hybrid view, near bias is rationally impermissible, while future bias is either rationally permissible or obligatory. Time neutralists, meanwhile, argue that the hybrid view is untenable. They claim that those who reject near bias should reject both biases and embrace time neutrality. To date, experimental work has focused on future-directed near bias. The primary aim of this paper is to shed light on the debate by investigating past-directed near bias. If people treat the past and future differently with respect to near bias, by being future-directed but not past-directed near biased, then this supports a particular version of the hybrid view: temporal metaphysic hybridism. If people treat the past and future the same with respect to near bias, then this supports a simple version of time neutralism, which explains both future bias and near bias in terms of the functioning of a single mechanism: the anticipatory/retrospectory mechanism. Our results undermine the claim that people are future-directed, but not past-directed, near biased, and hence do not support temporal metaphysic hybridism. They also fail to support simple time-neutralism; instead, they suggest that there are multiple mechanisms that differently shape future- and past-directed preferences.

近年来，在两大哲学家阵营之间爆发了关于向近端偏见（“近端偏见”）和对未来偏见（“未来偏见”）的合理性的分歧。根据传统的混合观点，接近偏差是合理不允许的，而未来偏差则是合理允许或强制的。同时，时间中立主义者认为混合观点是站不住脚的。他们声称那些拒绝接近偏差的人应该同时拒绝偏差并接受时间中立。迄今为止，实验工作已集中在面向未来的接近偏差上。本文的主要目的是通过调查过去的研究来阐明辩论接近偏见。如果人们在偏见方面对过去和未来有不同的对待，那就是通过对未来的偏见而不是对过去的偏见，那么这就支持了混合观点的一种特殊形式：时间形而上学的混合性。如果人们在近距离偏见方面对待过去和未来是相同的，那么这将支持时间中立主义的简单版本，它从单一机制（预期/反思机制）的功能方面解释了未来偏见和近距离偏见。我们的研究结果破坏了人们对未来的偏见，但对过去的偏见却不偏执，因此不支持时间形而上学的杂交。他们也无法支持简单的时间中立。相反，他们认为存在多种机制可以不同地塑造未来和过去的偏好。