In traditional reward systems, managers’ key performance indicators must surpass an agreed target in order to achieve a financial bonus. This system is designed to motivate high performance; yet adverse behavioural effects are often observed. These include middle managers becoming incentivised to game the reward system and target negotiation process they are subject to. This paper discusses three approaches to preventing such undesirable behavioural effects: Firstly, a linear pay-for-performance system without a target floor for receiving a performance bonus. Secondly, a bonus banking system where managers participate at the company’s losses as well as its gains. Thirdly, a proposal that uses the Beyond Budgeting approach which radically negates the core premises of the traditional reward system and replaces rewards for individual manager performance with those for wider team performance. These three approaches are compared and evaluated with respect to their potential to prevent unwanted manager behaviour, and on consideration of how effectively they may be operationalised.

在传统的奖励制度中，经理的关键绩效指标必须超过商定的目标才能获得财务奖励。该系统旨在激发高性能。但是经常观察到不良的行为影响。这些措施包括激励中层管理人员去玩他们所要遵循的奖励制度和目标谈判过程。本文讨论了防止此类不良行为影响的三种方法：首先，没有目标下限的线性绩效付费系统，用于获得绩效奖金。其次，建立奖金银行系统，经理人可以参与公司的亏损和收益。第三，一项使用超越预算的方法的提议，该提议从根本上否定了传统奖励系统的核心前提，并用更广泛的团队绩效替代了单个经理绩效的薪酬。对这三种方法进行了比较和评估，以评估它们防止潜在的经理行为的潜力，并考虑到它们的有效实施方式。