By promising, requesting and commanding we can give ourselves and each other reasons for acting as promised, requested, and commanded. Call this our capacity to give reasons robustly. According to the triggering account, we give reasons robustly simply by manipulating the factual circumstances in a way that triggers pre-existing reasons. Here I claim that we ought to reject the triggering account. By focusing on David Enoch’s sophisticated articulation of it, I argue that (i) it is overinclusive; (ii) it cannot adequately distinguish between threats and robust reason-giving; and (iii) it cannot adequately explain why epistemic reasons cannot be robustly given. I suggest that when we give reasons robustly, we do so directly, without explanatory intermediaries.

通过承诺，请求和命令，我们可以给出自己和彼此履行承诺，请求和命令的理由。称其为我们有力地说明理由的能力。根据触发事件的说明，我们可以简单地通过触发触发现有原因的方式来处理事实情况，从而可靠地给出原因。在这里，我声称我们应该拒绝触发帐户。通过关注大卫·伊诺克（David Enoch）对它的详尽阐述，我认为（i）它包含了过多的内容；（ii）无法充分区分威胁和合理的理由；（iii）它不能充分解释为什么不能有力地提出认知原因的原因。我建议，当我们有力地给出理由时，我们应该直接这样做，而无需解释性中介机构。