Naïve Realism claims that veridical perceptual experiences essentially consist in genuine relations between perceivers and mind-independent objects and their features. The contemporary debate in the philosophy of perception has devoted little attention to assessing one of the main motivations to endorse Naïve Realism–namely, that it is the only view which articulates our ‘intuitive’ conception of perception. In this paper, I first clarify in which sense Naïve Realism is supposed to be ‘naïve’. In this respect, I argue that it is put forward as the only view which can take our introspective knowledge of perception at face value, and I identify the two (alleged) key features of such introspective knowledge. Second, I challenge the claim that one of these features-namely, that it seems as one could not be in the same perceptual state unless the putative objects of perception existed and were perceived–is introspectively evident. Consequently, I argue that a view of perceptual experience–such as Intentionalism–which denies that this feature is true of perception can still take introspection at face value. This undermines the claim that Naïve Realism is the only account which accommodates our intuitions on the nature of perception.

幼稚的现实主义主张，垂直的知觉体验本质上在于知觉者与独立于心理的客体及其特征之间的真正关系。当代关于感知哲学的辩论很少关注评估认可朴素现实主义的主要动机之一，即它是唯一表达我们“直觉”感知概念的观点。在本文中，我首先澄清天真的现实主义应该被认为是“天真的”的意思。在这方面，我认为提出这一观点是唯一可以使我们的内省型知识以面值获得的观点，并且我确定了这种内省型知识的两个（所谓的）关键特征。其次，我对以下这些主张之一提出异议：内在地证明，除非假定的感知对象存在并被感知，否则似乎不可能处于相同的感知状态。因此，我认为对感知经验的看法（例如意图主义）否认该特征对感知的真实性，仍然可以从表面价值上进行内省。这破坏了这样一种说法，即朴素的现实主义是满足我们对感知本质的直觉的唯一说明。