When is it fitting for an agent to feel guilt over an outcome, and for others to be morally indignant with her over it? A popular answer requires that the outcome happened because of the agent, or that the agent was a cause of the outcome. This paper reviews some of what makes this causal-explanatory view attractive before turning to two kinds of problem cases: cases of collective harms and cases of fungible switching. These, it is argued, motivate a related but importantly different answer. What is required for fitting guilt and indignation is that the agent is relevantly implicated in that outcome: that the agent’s morally substandard responsiveness to reasons, or substandard caring, is relevantly involved in a normal explanation of it. This answer, it is further argued, makes sense because when an agent’s substandard caring is so involved, the outcome provides a lesson against such caring, a lesson central to the function of guilt and indignation.

代理人什么时候对结果感到内疚，而其他人在道德上对她感到愤慨？一个流行的答案要求结果是由于代理而发生的，或者代理是结果的原因。在转向两种问题案例之前，本文回顾了使这种因果解释性观点具有吸引力的一些原因：集体损害案例和可替代转换案例。有人认为，这些激发了一个相关但重要的不同答案。适应内疚和愤慨所需要的是代理人被相关牵连在那个结果中：代理人在道德上对理由的不合标准的反应，或不合标准的关怀，与对它的正常解释相关。有人进一步认为，这个答案是有道理的，因为当代理人的不合标准的关怀如此涉及时，结果提供了反对这种关怀的教训，这是内疚和愤慨功能的核心教训。