In “On what matters: Personal identity as a phenomenological problem” (2020), Steven Crowell engages a number of contemporary interpretations of Husserl’s account of the person and personal identity by noting that they lack a phenomenological elucidation of the self as commitment. In this article, in response to Crowell, I aim to show that such an account of the self as commitment can be drawn from Husserl’s work by looking more closely at his descriptions from the time of Ideas and after of the self as ego or I and egoic experience as attentive experience. I specifically aim to sketch the beginning of a response to three questions I take Crowell to be posing to a Husserlian account of the person and personal identity: (1) What more than pre-reflective self-awareness can be attributed to the self on phenomenological grounds so that we can understand, phenomenologically speaking, how selves become persons? (2) How can what characterizes the self in addition to pre-reflective self-awareness be discerned in both our commitment to truth and our feeling bound by love and other emotive commitments that cannot be fully rationally justified, which Husserl acknowledges are both sources of personal self-constitution? And (3), do all selves become persons? In the paper I elaborate how my answers to the first two questions turn on the self not just being self-aware but active in a particular sense. And to begin to address the third question, I suggest that while any form of wakeful conscious experience is both self-aware and active, this activity of the self makes a difference for those who are socio-historically embedded in the way we are. Specifically, on the proposed Husserlian account, selves that are socio-historically embedded become persons in and through their active relating to what they attentively experience. In concluding, I indicate how this Husserlian account might compare to Crowell’s claim that “self-identity (ipseity) is not mere logical identity (A=A) but a normative achievement […] which makes a ‘personal’ kind of identity possible” (2020).

史蒂文·克洛威尔（Steven Crowell）在“重要内容：将个人身份作为现象学问题”（2020年）中指出，胡塞尔缺乏对自我作为承诺的现象学阐释，从而对胡塞尔对个人和个人身份的描述进行了许多当代解释。在本文中，为了回应克洛尔，我旨在表明，可以通过更仔细地观察胡塞尔从《观念》时代起对他的描述，来对这种自我即承诺的描述可以从胡塞尔的作品中得出。自我作为自我或自我之后，自我体验作为专心的经历。我的具体目的是勾勒出我对克洛厄尔提出的关于侯赛尔人与人身身份的三个问题的回答的开始：（1）现象学上的自我可以归结为反思前的自我意识的理由，以便我们从现象学上可以理解自我是如何成为人的？（2）在我们对真理的承诺和我们被爱所束缚的感觉以及其他无法完全合理辩解的情感承诺中，如何辨别除自我反射前的自我之外，自我的特征是什么，胡塞尔承认这也是两者的来源。个人自我宪法？还有（3）所有人都会成为人吗？在本文中，我将详细说明我对前两个问题的回答如何开启自我，而不仅仅是自我意识，而且在特定意义上是活跃的。在开始讨论第三个问题时，我建议，尽管任何形式的唤醒意识体验都具有自我意识和主动性，但自我的这种活动对于那些在社会历史上嵌入我们的方式的人们来说，确实有所不同。具体而言，根据拟议的侯赛尔人的解释，具有社会历史意义的自我成为人们与他们所关注的经历的积极联系并通过他们的积极联系而成为人们。最后，我指出了这个Husserlian帐户可以与Crowell所说的“自我身份（我建议，尽管任何形式的唤醒意识体验都具有自我意识和主动性，但自我的这种活动对于那些以社会历史方式嵌入我们的方式的人们来说却有所不同。具体而言，根据拟议的侯赛尔人的解释，具有社会历史意义的自我成为人们与他们所关注的经历的积极联系并通过他们的积极联系而成为人们。最后，我指出了这个Husserlian帐户可以与Crowell所说的“自我身份（我建议，尽管任何形式的唤醒意识体验都具有自我意识和主动性，但自我的这种活动对于那些以社会历史方式嵌入我们的方式的人们来说却有所不同。具体而言，根据拟议的侯赛尔人的解释，具有社会历史意义的自我成为人们与他们所关注的经历的积极联系并通过他们的积极联系而成为人们。最后，我指出了这个Husserlian帐户可以与Crowell所说的“自我身份（ipseity不仅是逻辑身份（A = A），而且是使“个人”身份成为可能的规范性成就[…]（2020年）。