When perception is made the subject of philosophy, it is primarily understood as pre-theoretical sensual knowledge, and the question of its truth content becomes the focus of attention. In contrast, approaches that fall within the philosophy of embodiment quite rightly point out that perception is bodily anchored and closely linked to interests in action. The primacy of knowledge is therefore substituted by a primacy of praxis. This article aims to point out the blind spots that such a hegemony of the practical entails. In a phenomenological way, it is to be shown that beside the aspect of instrumentality, perceptive situations are also experienced as pleasant or unpleasant as such. This points to the importance of the pathical character of perception. However, it is not a call to enthrone the primacy of affect instead of the primacy of practice. The paper concludes with a thought on the philosophy of pedagogy and education. Proceeding from that perceptive position, it is argued that film in particular offers a chance to apply the phenomenology of pathical perception to the field of intersubjectivity.

当知觉成为哲学的主题时，它首先被理解为理论前的感性知识，其真实性问题成为人们关注的焦点。相反，落入实施哲学范围内的方法很正确地指出，感知是身体的基础，与行动的利益紧密相连。因此，知识的至高无上被实践的至高无上所取代。本文旨在指出这种霸权实践所带来的盲点。以现象学的方式表明，除了工具性方面，感知的情况也同样令人愉快或不愉快。这指出了感知的病理特征的重要性。但是，这不是呼吁将情感放在首位，而不是在实践上放在首位。本文以对教育学和教育哲学的思考作为结尾。从这种知觉立场出发，有人认为电影特别为将可悲的感知现象学应用于主体间性领域提供了机会。