In this article, I explore the encounter of the Mādhva philosopher Vyāsatīrtha with the works of the Navya-Naiyāyika Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya. The article is based on original translations of passages from Vyāsatīrtha’s Nyāyāmrta and Tarkatāṇḍava. Philosophically, the article focuses on the issue of empty-terms/nonexistent entities, particularly in the context of the theory of inference. I begin by outlining the origin of the Mādhva and Nyāya positions about these issues in their respective analyses of perceptual illusion. I then contrast the role of Gaṅgeśa’s thought in the Nyāyāmrta and Tarkatāṇḍava and show how Vyāsatīrtha responds to Gaṅgeśa’s ideas in different ways in those texts. I conclude with a discussion of how Vyāsatīrtha defends the Mādhva theory of “substrate-free” qualities against Gaṅgeśa in order to show that we can think and make valid inferences about nonexistent things.

中文翻译：

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Navya-Nyāya 对 Mādhva Vedānta 的影响：Vyāsatīrtha 和空词问题

在这篇文章中，我探讨了 Mādhva 哲学家 Vyāsatīrtha 与 Navya-Naiyāyika Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya 的作品的相遇。这篇文章基于 Vyāsatīrtha 的 Nyāyāmrta 和 Tarkatāṇḍava 段落的原始翻译。从哲学上讲，这篇文章侧重于空项/不存在实体的问题，尤其是在推理理论的背景下。我首先概述了 Mādhva 和 Nyāya 在他们各自对知觉幻觉的分析中对这些问题的立场的起源。然后，我对比了 Gaṅgeśa 思想在 Nyāyāmrta 和 Tarkatāṇḍava 中的作用，并展示了 Vyāsatīrtha 如何在这些文本中以不同方式回应 Gaṅgeśa 的思想。