In this paper, I try to demonstrate a problem with two medieval European views of existence: The property view and the essence view. Adopting a style of reasoning employed by the Indian Madhyamaka philosopher Nāgārjuna, I argue that both the property view and the essence view understand the relation between an object and its existence in terms of difference: The former understands the difference as the difference between an object and its property of existence, and the latter, as the difference between an object’s essence and existence. Neither understanding is without problems, and both lack explanatory power. We must reject both the views.

中文翻译：

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对财产观和存在本质观的Madhyamaka分析

在本文中，我试图用两种中世纪的欧洲生存观来证明一个问题：财产观和本质观。我主张采用印度中央邦哲学家纳格拉朱纳（Nāgārjuna）的推理方式，认为财产观和本质观都从差异的角度理解了客体与存在之间的关系：前者将客体理解为客体与客体之间的差异。它的存在属性，后者作为对象的本质与存在之间的区别。两种理解都不是没有问题，并且都缺乏解释力。我们必须拒绝这两种观点。