The main aim of this paper is to analyse David Lewis’ version of contextualism and his solution to the Gettier problem and the lottery problem through the employment of his Rule of Relevance and Stewart Cohen’s response to these problems. Here I analyse whether Stewart Cohen’s response to David Lewis’ solutions to these problems is on the right track or not. Hence, I try to analyse some concept in David Lewis and Stewart Cohen which has remained unanalysed. Cohen tries to show that when we try to solve some variation of the lottery problem and the Gettier problem by applying Lewis’s Rule of Relevance, then it generates some counterintuitive result. So Cohen gives Lewis some alternatives (which are explained in “The Strategy of Biting the Bullet and the Problem of Interference” and “Biting the Bullet Strategy as a Natural Extension of Contextualist Resolution to the Sceptical Problem and the Pity Poor Bill Variation of the Lottery Problem” sections) to avoid this counterintuitive result; this attempt, however, affects some other presuppositions of the contextual theory of David Lewis. My aim in this paper is to show how without taking these alternatives suggested by Cohen, Lewis can apply his Rules of Relevance to solve the lottery problem and the Gettier problem without any counterintuitive result.

本文的主要目的是通过运用大卫·刘易斯的关联规则和斯图尔特·科恩对这些问题的回应来分析大卫·刘易斯的情境主义及其对格蒂尔问题和彩票问题的解决方案。在这里，我分析了斯图尔特·科恩（Stewart Cohen）对大卫·刘易斯（David Lewis）对这些问题的解决方案的回应是否正确。因此，我尝试分析戴维·刘易斯和斯图尔特·科恩的一些概念，这些概念至今仍未得到分析。科恩试图证明，当我们试图通过运用刘易斯相关性规则来解决彩票问题和盖蒂尔问题的某些变化时，就会产生一些违反直觉的结果。因此，科恩为刘易斯提供了一些替代方案（在“咬住子弹的策略和干扰问题”和“咬住子弹的策略，将其作为上下文主义解决方案的自然扩展，以解释怀疑的问题和可怜的彩票差额变化）中进行了解释。问题”部分），以避免出现这种违反直觉的结果；然而，这种尝试影响了戴维·刘易斯的情境理论的其他一些前提。我在本文中的目的是表明，在不采用科恩（Cohen）建议的替代方案的情况下，刘易斯（Lewis）如何应用他的相关性规则来解决彩票问题和格蒂尔（Gettier）问题，而没有任何违反直觉的结果。影响戴维·刘易斯的情境理论的其他一些前提。我在本文中的目的是表明，在不采用科恩（Cohen）建议的替代方案的情况下，刘易斯（Lewis）如何应用他的相关性规则来解决彩票问题和格蒂尔（Gettier）问题，而没有任何违反直觉的结果。影响戴维·刘易斯的情境理论的其他一些前提。我在本文中的目的是表明，在不采用科恩（Cohen）建议的替代方案的情况下，刘易斯（Lewis）如何应用他的相关性规则来解决彩票问题和格蒂尔（Gettier）问题，而没有任何违反直觉的结果。