This paper asks: What are the factors that affect the recruitment sources of the two most senior management functions in banks—the board chairperson and the chief executive officer? Prior research has focused on the factors affecting the recruitment sources of senior management in corporations in general and has accorded less attention to banks. Therefore, research thus far has not fully accounted for the ability of banking regulators to affect the recruitment sources of these managers. The paper applies an in-depth qualitative study to delineate the recruitment sources of the chairpersons and the CEOs, from the inception of the State of Israel in 1948 to 2019, asserting that Israel’s central bank affects the recruitment sources of the banks’ chairpersons and CEOs through both formal and informal measures. This has enabled the banking regulators to wield influence over the banks and maintain their financial stability in the long run. The paper can thus be read as part of a wider effort to demonstrate that even in the neoliberal era, state actors are still key players.

本文提出：影响银行两个最高管理职能部门（董事会主席和首席执行官）的招聘来源的因素是什么？先前的研究集中在一般影响公司高级管理人员招聘来源的因素上，而对银行的关注较少。因此，迄今为止的研究尚未完全说明银行业监管机构影响这些经理人的招聘来源的能力。从1948年以色列国成立到2019年，该论文运用了深入的定性研究来描绘主席和CEO的招聘来源，声称以色列中央银行影响着银行董事长和CEO的招聘来源通过双方正式和非正式措施。从长远来看，这使银行业监管机构能够对银行施加影响，并维持其金融稳定性。因此，该论文可以被视为更广泛努力的一部分，以证明即使在新自由主义时代，国家行为者仍然是关键角色。