Chakravartty puts forward a view of scientific knowledge that conceives of properties attributed to objects by scientific models as dispositions. Those dispositions refer to the capacity of an object to behave differently in different circumstances. This pluralism of behaviour is intended to show that perspectivalism does not exclude the possibility of non-perspectival knowledge. To support this claim, he offers an analogy between conflicting models and contrastive explanations. I examine the strength of the purported analogy between conflicting models and contrastive explanations. Then, I analyse this dispositionalist account of properties in order to assess whether ontological pluralism can meet the challenge that conflicting models pose to the scientific realism. To conclude, I contend that to accomplish this goal, a more detailed account of dispositional properties should be provided, as well as a theory of explanatory relevance.

查克拉瓦蒂（Chakravartty）提出了一种科学知识的观点，该观点将科学模型归因于对象的特性视为倾向。这些倾向指的是对象在不同情况下表现不同的能力。行为的这种多元性旨在表明，透视主义并不排除非透视性知识的可能性。为了支持这一主张，他在冲突的模型和对比性的解释之间进行了类比。我研究了相互矛盾的模型与对比性解释之间所谓的类比的力量。然后，我分析了这种性格倾向的属性说明，以评估本体论多元化是否可以应对冲突的模型对科学现实主义构成的挑战。总而言之，我认为要实现这一目标，