The interaction between Russia and Gulf countries represents the story of ups and downs, severe conflicts and sharp warmings that can largely be explained by the permanently changing role and place of each of these players at the global and Middle Eastern political arenas. After Russia's “return” to the Middle East in 2012–2015, Moscow's foreign policy towards the Gulf can be explained in terms of a bargaining strategy. On the one hand, Russia is trying to underline its importance and relevance to the GCC by putting forward diplomatic and political initiatives. The Kremlin uses its direct or indirect presence in the key regional conflicts such as the Syrian, Libyan and Yemeni civil wars as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iran’s nuclear issue. On the other hand, Russia is interested in building up stronger economic cooperation with the GCC, drawing bigger volumes of investments from the Gulf to Russia’s broken economy, as well as coordinating efforts with Saudi Arabia in the global oil market. While, in the near future, the qualitative evolution of Russia’s relations with the GCC is hardly possible, there are still options for their deepening within the current level of interaction between Moscow and the Gulf.

俄罗斯与海湾国家之间的互动体现了起起伏伏，严重冲突和急剧升温的故事，这在很大程度上可以由这些参与者在全球和中东政治舞台上的角色和地位的不断变化来解释。在俄罗斯于2012年至2015年“重返”中东之后，可以用讨价还价策略来解释莫斯科对海湾的外交政策。一方面，俄罗斯通过提出外交和政治举措，试图强调其对海湾合作委员会的重要性。克里姆林宫直接或间接地用于主要的区域冲突，例如叙利亚，利比亚和也门的内战，以及以巴冲突和伊朗的核问题。另一方面，俄罗斯有兴趣与海湾合作委员会（GCC）建立更强大的经济合作关系，从海湾地区吸引更多投资到俄罗斯的经济疲软，以及与沙特阿拉伯在全球石油市场上进行协调。尽管在不久的将来，俄罗斯与海湾合作委员会的关系不可能发生质的演变，但在莫斯科和海湾之间的当前互动水平内，仍存在着加深两国关系的选择。